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ABSTRACT
When a product’s product provision entails fixed costs, it will be made available only if a sufficient
number of people want it. Some products are produced and consumed locally, so that provision
requires not only a large group favoring the product but a large number nearby. Just as one has an
incentive to sort into community whose median voter shares his preferences for local public goods,
product markets may provide an analogous incentive to sort into a community whose consumers tend
to share his preferences in private goods. Using zip code level data on chain restaurants and
restaurants overall, this paper documents how the mix of locally available restaurants responds to
the local mix of consumers, with three findings. First, based on survey data on chain restaurant
patronage, restaurant preferences differ substantially by race and education. Second, there is a strong
relationship between restaurants and population at the zip code level, suggesting that restaurants’
geographic markets are small. Finally, the mix of locally available chain restaurants is sensitive to
the zipcode demographic mix by race and by education. Hence, differentiated product markets
provide a benefit  ￿ proximity to preferred restaurants  ￿ to persons in geographic markets whose
customers tend to share their preferences.
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   When fixed costs are large relative to market size and preferences differ across 
individuals, then consumers get what they want only to the extent that others also want it.  
This creates a benefit from participating as a customer in markets with others sharing 
similar tastes to allow access to appealing products.  Economists have long understood 
this explicitly in the context of publicly provided goods, such as elementary schools or 
police protection.  Because local public goods are allocated through collective choice, the 
median voter determines the amount of spending on, say, schools in each municipality.  
Potential residents then choose among communities and select the one that best matches 
their tastes.  The resulting “Tiebout sorting” has people agglomerating into communities 
with others sharing their preferences for local public goods. 
  Of course, people consume vastly more commercial than publicly provided local 
goods and services.
1  Research on residential sorting puts private consumption in the 
background by assuming that private goods are equally available in all locales.  Private 
goods and services are implicitly assumed to be ubiquitously available, perhaps because 
they are produced at constant returns, so that location choice does not affect access.  Yet, 
this is certainly not true.  A potentially important factor overlooked in previous research 
is the role of commercial markets for differentiated product in rewarding and perhaps 
promoting the agglomeration of persons sharing similar preferences for private products.
2  
When the provision of a product entails fixed costs, it will be made available only if a 
sufficient number of people want it.  When the product is difficult to trade across space – 
a “local private good” – its provision requires not only a large number of people favoring 
the product, but a large number nearby. 
                                                 
1 Local property taxes totaled $264 billion in 2001, less than 4 percent as high as personal consumption 
expenditures of $6.9 trillion (see ERP, 2004). 
2 For brevity I use the term “product” to describe both goods and services.   2
  If the provision of appealing commercial products depends on the distribution of 
local tastes, then product markets can provide a rationale alongside local public goods for 
sorting.  Just as one has an incentive to sort into community whose median voter shares 
his preferences local public goods, markets may provide an analogous incentive to sort 
into a community whose median consumer shares his preferences in local private goods. 
  Recent research documents that different groups (e.g. blacks and whites, 
Hispanics and non-Hispanics) have starkly different preferences in a number of product 
categories (Waldfogel, 2003, 2004; George and Waldfogel, 2003).  For example, blacks 
and whites have starkly different preferences in radio and television programming, as 
well as newspaper content.  Because these products have large fixed costs, whether a 
metro area has, say, a black-targeted radio station requires the area to have a substantial 
black population.  This mechanism, termed a “preference externality,” increases the 
welfare of blacks as media consumers as their metro areas have more blacks.  Although 
these products are local, media content has essentially zero transport costs within metro 
areas, so preference externalities operating through this product market operate 
throughout MSAs, not only within neighborhoods. 
  Few topics have received as much attention from social scientists as the causes 
and consequences of residential segregation by race.  US ghettoes formed as blacks 
migrated out of southern agriculture and into northern US cities prior to 1950 and were 
herded by white racism into particular neighborhoods.  It appears that segregation is bad 
for black economic and social outcomes (Massey & Denton, 1991; Cutler & Glaeser, 
1997).  Yet, segregation is eroding only slowly.  The slow erosion of segregation is 
somewhat surprising in light of both academic evidence and popular belief that urban life   3
is inimical to health and success.  Why would blacks choose to live in segregated 
neighborhoods, despite the apparent harmful effects of this choice on health, 
employment, single parenthood, and a host of other outcomes?   No single factor is likely 
to serve as a convincing explanation.  Racism, housing prices, neighborhood 
demographic composition all presumably still play a role, but local product markets may 
also promote residential segregation. 
  Since the diffusion of the Sears Catalogue in conjunction with mail delivery a 
century ago, or the widespread adoption of the Internet more recently, the disadvantages 
of residential isolation in access to “dry goods” has diminished.  Even people who live far 
from concentrations of population – or from persons sharing their tastes – still have 
access to unlimited variety of books, CDs, clothing and other tradable items.  And, 
indeed, there is evidence that isolated persons make relatively more use of the Internet 
and mail order channels to obtain such goods (Sinai and Waldfogel, 2004).  For other, 
“perishable” goods, including many raw and prepared foods, residential location affects 
the ease – or feasibility – with which one can obtain items.  The location of 
manufacturing is largely decoupled from the locations of consumption (think of 
automobiles, etc).  For services, by contrast, this decoupling is more difficult.  An 
extreme example illustrates the point.   Jewish law requires a minyan of 10 men to 
conduct a religious service.  Moreover, Orthodox Jews are not allowed to drive during the 
Sabbath.  As a result, observant Orthodox Jews must live walking distance from their 
synagogue.  In this instance, the market for religious services gives rise to agglomeration 
of at least 10 male Orthodox Jews around each synagogue.   4
This paper asks whether preference externalities operate through the restaurant 
market.  This industry provides an auspicious context for study because restaurants 
geographically couple production and consumption.  Under two simple conditions, the 
agglomeration of groups sharing food preferences will bring forth restaurants that appeal 
to the respective groups.  First, food preferences must differ substantially between 
groups.  Second, the fixed costs of operating restaurants must be sufficiently large that 
restaurants appealing to each group only arise with sufficient local concentrations of 
persons favoring a particular variety.  Then neighborhoods with more members of a 
particular group will have more restaurants catering to the group’s preferences. 
  It is by no means obvious that these conditions hold for this industry.  First, 
restaurant fixed costs do not, on their face, appear very large.  In the other industries 
where preference externalities have been documented, fixed costs are quite large relative 
to market size.   The number of products per market provides a rough (implicit) measure 
of fixed costs in relation to market size.  Daily newspaper markets typically have one or 
two products per market; radio markets have on average about 20 (across large US metro 
areas).  Restaurants, by contrast, are far more numerous.  There are 500,000 restaurants in 
the US, approximately 1 per 600 persons.  A metro area of 1 million persons typically has 
about 1,500 restaurants.  The fixed cost of operating a restaurant is of a lower order of 
magnitude.  Yet, the market area of a restaurant may be much smaller than a metro area, 
so the large number of restaurants per MSA does not imply that fixed costs are small 
relevant to the size of the relevant market. 
  This paper proceeds in four sections.  Section 1 sketches a simple product 
differentiation framework for thinking about preference externalities in this market and   5
links the paper to the four literatures adjacent to this study.  Section 2 describes the data 
used in the study (Reference USA for chains, Zipcode Business Patterns for total 
restaurants, Census 2000 for demographic data, Scarborough Research for data on 
restaurant chain patronage by race).  Section 3 presents results.  First, we show how 
restaurant preferences differ by race, Hispanic status, and education.  Second, we explore 
the size of the relevant market area for restaurants.  We document that the relationship 
between the number of restaurants in an area and market size, as measured by population, 
is very similar at highly aggregated (3-digit zipcode and finely disaggregated (5-digit 
zipcode) levels of geography.  This suggests that restaurant markets are quite local.   
Third, I find that the contour of locally available products relates strongly to the 
distribution of local types by race, Hispanic status, and education/income.  While most 
restaurants – and restaurants as a group – are less available in more heavily black, 
Hispanic, or less educated areas, some categories of restaurants (those catering to 
respective groups) are actually more available.    This indicates that product markets 
bring forth what groups want to a greater extent as the groups agglomerate into relevant 
market areas.  To put this another way, differentiated product markets provide a benefit to 
persons sorting into geographic markets whose customers tend to share their preferences.  
 
I. Background and Framework 
1. Background 
  This research stands at the confluence of three literatures in industrial and urban 
economics.  First, this work is related to the literature on Tiebout (1956) sorting (Epple 
and Sieg, 1999) based on publicly provided goods, or in some cases housing and   6
neighborhood attributes (Bayer, et al, 2002).  Second, this work is related to the specific 
strand of the sorting literature on the causes (and consequences) of ghettoes (Massey and 
Denton, 1993; Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor, 1999).  Third, 
because of its focus on commercially rather than publicly provided goods, this work is 
related to the industrial literature on entry that relates the number of available products to 
market size (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1990, 1991; Berry, 1992).  More recently, this 
literature has begun to treat space explicitly (Seim, 2003).
3  Our focus on the differential 
appeal of products to heterogeneous consumers recalls work on “preference externalities” 
in media markets (Waldfogel, 2003, 2004; George and Waldfogel, 2003).  Finally, this 
work relates to research on urban quality of life (Gyourko and Tracy, 1991) and to more 
recent research emphasizing the consumption benefits of agglomeration (Glaeser, Kolko, 
and Saiz, 2001; Berry and Waldfogel, 2003). 
 
2. Framework 
  The relationship between the agglomeration of like individuals and available 
product variety results from joint process of a) individuals choosing where to live, and b) 
firms choosing where to locate their outlets.  Causality could easily run both ways.  
Individuals might choose where to live, at least in part, based on the products available in 
a neighborhood.  And, at the same time, firms choose where to place their outlets based 
on the patterns of agglomeration.
4 
                                                 
3 The “central place theory” tradition in urban economics is similarly concerned with the location of 
shopping establishments.  Christaller (1966) is the classic reference; Eaton and Lipsey (1982) provides a 
contemporary treatment of equilibria built up from maximizing behavior of consumers and firms.  
4   When viewed as a simultaneous move game – and starting from a blank slate – the entry-
residential location game can have multiple equilibria.  To see this, suppose there are 2 each of two types of 
people (P and B for pizza and burger lovers) and two locations (X and Y), each with room for 2 people.    7
  The history of black people in the US indicates that the entry and residential 
location game was never played on a blank slate (see Massey & Denton, 1991; Cutler & 
Glaeser, 1997).  There is a well-documented history of discrimination and forced 
segregation into particular neighborhoods that replaces the first player’s choice of a 
location in the blank slate.  Evidence seems to suggest that, perhaps until recently, 
subsequent black players in this game were also compelled to choose particular 
neighborhoods. Under that view, the degree of agglomeration of like types of the data is 
exogenous, so that we can proceed to study its effect on patterns of entry.
5   
  Taking the distribution of population as given, we can think about the entry 
process using a framework in the spirit of Hotelling (1929).   Within a market area, 
suppose that restaurants are differentiated only by cuisine and that cuisine itself can be 
represented along a single dimension.  To fix ideas, one might think about this dimension 
as the extent to which a restaurant is targeted to, say, blacks.  Market areas differ in the 
distribution of their consumers’ preferences (or most-preferred restaurant type).  Suppose 
that white consumers’ most preferred cuisine is distributed according to F( ), while black 
consumers are described by G( ).  Suppose – against fact but in favor of simplicity – that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Suppose that pizza and burger outlets require 2 customers each to be viable.  Firms would rather be viable 
than not exist.  Finally, suppose that individuals only patronize restaurants in their location.  They are 
happier with their preferred cuisine than with non-consumption.  And they would rather consume nothing 
than the output of their non-preferred outlet.  
    This game has two equilibria, both with agglomeration of like individuals: 
1)  location X can have 2 P’s while Y has 2 B’s.  In that case X gets a pizza restaurant and Y gets a 
burger restaurant.   
2)  Location Y can have 2 P’s while X has 2 B’s.  In that case Y gets a pizza restaurant and X gets a 
burger restaurant. 
Both of these outcomes make the consumers and firms as happy as possible.  The other possible outcome, 
with 1 P and 1 B in each location results in no entry and no consumption. 
  In this game, as soon as anyone has chosen a location, the equilibrium is assured.  Suppose a P 
moves to location Y.  Now a B has no incentive to move to Y because he will be assured of no local burger 
entry.  Another P, however, is assured of pizza as long as he co-locates with the other P. 
 
5 If residential agglomeration is endogenous, the relationship between agglomeration of like individuals and 
entry still allows statements about the product options experienced by agglomerating individuals.   8
each firm operates no more than one outlet in a market (to avoid multiproduct firm 
concerns).  Whether entry occurs – and where the firm(s) will locate - depends on how 
consumers’ willingness to patronize restaurants varies with their distance from their ideal. 
  Suppose that, because of fixed costs, each outlet requires 100 customers for 
viability.  If the market area has fewer than 100 persons, no entry will occur.  If the area 
has at least 100 persons, and people are willing to patronize any cuisine, then at least one 
restaurant will enter.  If travel costs (among cuisines, not space) matter and the market 
can accommodate only one entrant, then it will locate where it can attract the most 
patrons.  If the distribution of most-preferred cuisine locations is single-peaked, the firm 
will locate at the mode.  The shape of the distribution of preferences determines the 
nature of the product available to all consumers.  This is the product market analogue to 
what Mill (1978) termed the “tyranny of the majority” in collective choice.
6  If the 
distribution of ideal cuisines were symmetric, the mode would be the median, and then 
the sort of person who would be most happy in this market would share the preferences 
of the median consumer. 
As the population grows beyond 200, a second restaurant is viable.  If customers 
have no “travel costs,” then the second restaurant’s location is indeterminate (given that 
prices are being treated as fixed).  If travel costs matter, i.e. consumers prefer to patronize 
a restaurant nearer to their ideal, then firms’ location decisions grow sensitive to the 
distribution of preferences.  Moroever, the distribution of restaurant types available in the 
market grows sensitive to the respective populations of blacks and whites. 
                                                 
6 Friedman (1962) argues that reliance on markets avoids the tyranny of the majority, or that while the use 
of political channels “tends to strain the social cohesion essential for a stable society,” the “widespread use 
of the market reduces the strain on the social fabric by rendering conformity unnecessary.”  (pp. 23-4) 
   9
  To say this more concretely, we need a way of characterizing entry equilibria.  In 
general, problems of this type are made difficult by two things.  First, firms are usually 
modeled as competing on price, given their entry position.  A firm that can charge high 
prices can subsist with a smaller market than a firm facing competitive pressure on 
pricing.  Second, characterizing equilibrium requires some assumption about 
commitment.  If a firm has entered at location x, will it necessarily stay there in the face 
of competitive entry nearby?   
  Given our goal – showing how the distribution of available restaurant types can 
reflect the distribution of potential customers – we make the simplifying assumption that 
prices are fixed.  Chain ownership may provide a fig leaf of justification for this 
assumption.  Equilibrium occurs when no potential entrant wishes to enter and no 
existing firm wishes to exit.   To make this concrete, we need a characterization of what a 
firm, located at x, gets as its payoff.  Suppose H( ) is the cumulative density of potential 
customers.  Suppose the nearest firms in product space are at y and z, where y < x < z.  
Since customers patronze their nearest outlets, customers located between (y+x)/2 and 
(x+z)/2 will patronize the firm at x:  Their patronage is therefore: H((x+z)/2) - 
H((x+y)/2).  Suppose fixed costs are such that the minimum patronage for viability is K.   
What are the conditions for equilibrium?  First, any firm, such as the firm at x 
must be viable.  That is, H((x+z)/2) - H((x+y)/2) > K.  Second, there must not be any 
space between y and z to allow another firm viability (assuming the firm at y, x, and z 
remain where they are).  These conditions simply dictate that outlets be neither too close 
nor too far from one another in equilibrium.  Of course, the relevant distance is not   10
literally the distance but rather then number of customers they each garner.  Regions of 
product space with greater customer density will support more outlets in equilibrium. 
Now decompose H into its black and white components, F and G.  Different 
markets have different numbers of blacks and whites.  Areas with more potential 
customers – more population – will have more outlets.  In areas with lots of blacks, in 
particular, we expect a denser clustering in black-preferred regions of product space.  In 
areas with more black-targeted outlets, blacks have options closer to their products-space 
ideal.  In this more general context, a person need not share the median consumer’s 
preferences to find an  appealing product; however, there must be some concentration of 
consumers with similar preferences to ensure a variety that is nearby in product space.  
This is one version of what Spence (1976) terms the problem of “product selection.”   
What is offered is what can attract a large base of customers.   
This setup suggests the three questions we will examine empirically below: 1) do 
restaurant preferences differ across groups?; 2) how does the number of restaurants in a 
locale vary with population, at various levels of geographic aggregation – by extension, 
what is the de facto relevant market area?; and 3) is the mix of available products 
sensitive to the mix of potential consumers in the population? 
  
II. Data  
  The basic dataset we employ to document the relationship between the mix of 
consumers and the available mix of restaurants is a 5-digit zipcode cross section with 
information on the total number of restaurants, the number of establishments in each of 
136 fast food and sit down chain restaurants, and demographic variables such as total   11
population and the share of population that is black, Hispanic, college-educated, and low-
income (households with under $40,000 in annual income).  We also aggregate the data 
to the four and three digit zipcode levels for some analyses.  (For brevity we will use the 
term “zipcode” to describe 5-digit zipcodes).  These data are drawn from three sources: 
Zipcode Business Patterns 2000, the 2000 Census, and Reference USA.  We restrict 
attention to the nearly 15,000 zipcodes in metropolitan areas. 
  The ZBP data reports the number of restaurants in each 5-digit zipcode in 2000.  
We include all establishments in NAICS code 722, Food Services and Drinking Places 
(see http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/def/722.HTM).  The total number of restaurants in 
the US in 1997 was 486,906, and these establishments had sales of $252 billion 
nationally.  Reference USA is a directory product that includes the address (including the 
zipcode) of every business in the US, including the outlets of the 136 major restaurant 
chains that we include in our sample.  Collectively, these chains account for 107,500 
metro area restaurants, or roughly one third of the 358,326 ZBP metro area restaurant 
locations in the US. 
  In addition, we have information from Scarborough Research on the whether each 
of 180,000 persons, in 66 large US markets, has patronized each of the 136 chain 
restaurants in the last 30 days.  These data are drawn from surveys undertaken during 
1999-2000.  We know the respondents’ race, Hispanic status, and education, allowing us 
to compare restaurant patronage patterns across these groups. 
  We are able to classify the chain restaurants by cuisine.  Based on review of the 
chains’ self-descriptions and menus, we classify the chains into burger, pizza, Mexican, 
chicken, and coffee/bagel restaurants.  Most of the chains remain unclassified, however.    12
Finally, using Consumer Reports 2003 restaurant survey, we can classify 52 of the 
sitdown chains by price range, including “the average amount readers paid for their own 
dinner and drinks, excluding tip” (<$10, $11-14, $15-19, $20-24, $25-29, $30+). 
  The top panel of table 1a summarizes our total restaurant and population data at 
various levels of geographic aggregation.  The mean (median) population for our urban 
zipcodes is 15,450 (9,965), while the mean (median) number of restaurants is 24.9 (12).  
The mean black and Hispanic percentages are about 10, far above the medians of roughly 
3.  There is substantial variation across zipcodes in the demographic variables.  For 
example, by race the 90
th percentile zipcode is nearly a third black; and by Hispanic 
status, the 90
th percentile zipcode is also nearly a third Hispanic. The mean and median 
college-educated percentage (of persons over age 25) is about 17, while the 90
th 
percentile is nearly a third. 
  The remaining panels of table 1a repeat the exercise of the top panel at higher 
levels of geographic aggregation.  There are 3960 metropolitan-area four-digit zipcode 
areas.  Four-digit zips have mean (median) population of roughly 58,000 (31,000) and a 
mean (median) of 94 (41) restaurants.  There are 684 three-digit zipcodes, and they have 
mean (median) population of about 338,000 (204,000) and a mean (median) of 545 (335) 
restaurants.   Despite their greater geographic aggregation, the three and four-digit 
zipcodes have as much variation in percent black, Hispanic, etc. as the 5-digit zips. 
  Table 1b shows the number of restaurants in groups of sample chains, and their 
tendency to be present, in 5, 4, and 3-digit zip code areas.  For example, 64 percent of 5-
digit zipcodes have at least one location of one of the 136 sample chains.  Over half of 5-
digit zips have one of the burger chains, while less than a third have a chicken chain, and   13
just over a quarter have a Mexican chain.  At higher levels of aggregation, the tendency 
for each chain to be present rises.  For example, 90 percent of 3-digit zips – areas 
averaging roughly 1000 square miles – have at least one of the chicken chains present, 
while only 31 percent of 5 digit zips – areas of 41 square miles – have at least one. 
 
III. Results 
Our discussion of results is divided into three areas.  First, we present evidence on 
how restaurant preferences differ across groups.  Second, we discuss the relationship 
between market size and restaurant entry overall, along with the related issue of market 
size.  Finally, we present evidence on the relationship the types of restaurants available 
nearby and the local distribution of population by race, Hispanic status, and education 
and income.  
1.  Do Restaurant Preferences Differ across groups? 
Before turning to data on restaurant patronage patterns of particular groups, it is 
useful to outline what information our question requires about preferences.  We are 
interested, for example, in whether blacks derive product market benefit from living 
among blacks.  For addressing whether members of a group benefit each other, it is 
sufficient to document unconditional differences in preferences across group.  Some part 
of a difference in product choices across groups may be attributable to some other cause, 
such as income.  If we wanted to say why, for example, blacks benefit each other through 
product markets, we would need to document not only that preferences differ across 
groups but also that they differ because of race.  We provide some such evidence below,   14
but we note that our argument – that people may affect each other through product 
markets –  does not rely on causal differences in preferences. 
a.  Race 
We have two means available to determine whether black and white food 
preferences differ.  First, we can appeal to historical accounts of the development of 
African American cuisine in the American South.  These sources describe slaves’ 
development of a cuisine based largely on ingredients that their white masters did not 
deign to consume. 
One account:   
The fresh vegetables found in Africa were replaced by the throwaway foods from the plantation 
house…  The slave diet began to evolve when slaves entered the plantation houses as cooks. With 
an array of new ingredients at their fingertips and a well-tuned African palate, the cooks would 
make delectable foods for their masters. Suddenly southern cooking took on new meaning. Fried 
chicken began to appear on the tables, sweet potatoes (which had replaced the African yam) sat 
next to the boiled white potato. 
7 
 
The cuisines mentioned in these accounts fall under the categories of “Southern 
cuisine,” as well as Creole and Cajun.  Particular foods include fried chicken, various 
shrimp recipes, catfish, hush puppies, crab cakes, cornbread muffins, and buttermilk 
biscuits. 
Some of these foods feature prominently in the offerings of chain restaurants.  In 
particular, fried chicken is the featured offering of four major chains in our sample: KFC, 
Church’s Fried Chicken, Bojangle’s, and Popeye’s Fried Chicken and Biscuits.  Seafood 
is the featured food at Long John Silver’s and Red Lobster.  On the basis of the historical 
                                                 
7 From “A History of Soul Food,” http://www.foxhome.com/soulfood/htmls/soulfood.html 
(Accessed 8/18/2004).  See also the Kraft Foods “African American Flavor Center,” at 
http://www.kraftfoods.com/esi.net/african_american/content.aspx?shortname=military&a=87 
   15
accounts, one might expect these restaurants to be disproportionately patronized by black 
consumers. 
We can, of course, examine black and non-black consumers’ patterns of 
restaurant patronage directly using the Scarborough data.  For each of 136 restaurant 
chains, these data indicate whether respondents patronized the restaurant in the 30 days 
prior to the survey (surveys are filled out throughout the year between Fall 1999 and 
Spring 2000). 
Tables 2 and 3 report the fraction of blacks and non-blacks patronizing each of the 
major chains in the past 30 days, and the results support the impression one would have 
from the historical accounts.
8  Blacks are far more likely than whites to patronize chains 
offering Southern fare.  Blacks are also somewhat more likely than whites to patronize 
Rally’s and Checker’s burger chains. 
Some part of the difference between black and white patronage rates is 
attributable to “constraints” such as restaurant availability and income levels rather than 
“preferences” per se.  While we do not know the location of blacks with the 66 metro 
areas covered by Scarborough, we do know income, age, gender, etc.  We can estimate 
probits on, say, the tendency to patronize KFC on race as well as the other observables in 
order to soak up the variation in patronage associated with location and income (as 
distinct from preferences).  When we do this, there remain substantial and statistically 
significant race differences.  After accounting for available observables – including MSA 
fixed effects, gender, and dummies for 5-year age ranges - blacks are roughly 20 
percentage points more likely (2 times as likely at KFC and 3 times as likely at Popeye’s) 
                                                 
8 We include in the table only chains that respondents report patronizing in at least 20 of the 66 surveyed 
markets.   16
to patronize the chicken chains than whites.  On the basis of evidence in tables 2 and 3, 
blacks and whites appear to have different preferences in prepared food.
9   
 
b.  Hispanic Status 
While the term “Hispanic” covers a broad range of national backgrounds, nearly 
60 percent of US Hispanics are of Mexican extraction.
10  One might therefore expect that 
Mexican restaurants cater to Hispanic tastes, although casual observation suggests that 
non-Hispanic consumers are major patrons of Mexican restaurants. 
Tables 2 and 3 show that the Hispanic tendency to patronize listed Mexican 
restaurants is higher than the non-Hispanic tendency.  For example, Hispanics have twice 
the tendency of non-Hispanics to have visited El Pollo Loco  or Rio Bravo Cantina in the 
past 30 days, and a 20 percent higher tendency to visit Taco Bell and Don Pablo’s. 
Hispanics also have elevated tendencies to visit a number of burger and pizza restaurants.  
The results in tables 2 and 3 suggest that black and white restaurant preferences are more 
different than Hispanic and non-Hispanic preferences. 
 
c.  Income/Education 
The Scarborough data report income only for a subset but education for the entire 
sample.  Given the strong relationship between income and education, we examine 
restaurant patronage by whether people have completed college.  Three things emerge 
from examination of tables 2 and 3.  First, college educated persons patronize coffee and 
                                                 
9 Note, however, that our argument does not require preferences to differ because of race.  Rather, we are 
simply classifying people into “blacks” and “whites” as two groups with different preferences. 
10 This information is available at  http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-3.pdf (accessed 
September 1, 2004).     17
bagel restaurants far more than their less educated counterparts (roughly double for 
Bruegger’s Bagels, Einstein Bros. Bagels, Noah Bagel, and Starbuck’s Coffee).  Second, 
the college educated are also less likely to patronize chicken restaurants (see Church’s, 
Lee’s Famous, KFC).  Third, college educated persons are more likely to patronize more 
expensive sitdown restaurants among the sitdown establishments that Consumer Reports 
(2003) classifies by price range.  College educated persons have roughly double the 
tendency of less educated persons to patronize the two most expensive chains in the 
sample, Houston’s and Ruth’s Chris.  By contrast, the college educated are relatively less 
likely to patronize Denny’s and IHOP. 
 
2.  What is the relevant market? 
Restaurants’ products are generally consumed where they are produced, so 
location matters more than with more easily tradable goods.   It is not immediately 
obvious what unit of geography corresponds to the market area for restaurants.  At one 
extreme, it seems unlikely that consumers patronize restaurants beyond their metropolitan 
areas, or – similarly – their 3-digit zips.   
Different types of restaurants surely have different-sized market areas, however.  
A “fancy” downtown restaurant patronized on special occasions presumably draws 
customers from throughout a metro area.  Fast food restaurants likely have smaller 
market areas.  Most markets have multiple McDonald’s restaurants, for example.  Except 
when traveling about their metro areas, residents are unlikely to travel beyond their 
nearest McDonald’s to patronize a different McDonald’s.  The relevant market size – and 
the correct geographic unit of analysis – is different for different types of restaurants.    18
Rather than attempt to resolve this question a priori, we will empirically explore the 
appropriate level of geographic aggregation. 
If demand for geographic areas’ restaurants were drawn from within the 
respective geographic areas, then we would expect a strong relationship between 
geographic area demand (measured, say, by population) and geographic area entry (the 
number of restaurant establishments operating, N).  Indeed, a relationship between N and 
population at some level of geographic aggregation indicates that supply for that area 
serves demand at – or within – that level.  We can draw some inferences about the 
relevant geographic market by examining the relationship between N and population at 
successively less aggregated levels of geography (3, 4, and 5-digit zips) 
We begin with the relationship between market size (measured by population) and 
the number of restaurant establishments operating (N).  The first column of table 4 
reports a regression of N on population at the 3-digit zip level across the 684 metro area 
3-digit zips.  A 3-digit zip with an additional 1000 persons has 1.51 more restaurants.  
Three digit zips average about 1000 square miles of overall land and water area.  If they 
were circular, they would have mean radius of 15.1 miles.  It seems likely that restaurants 
in a 3-digit zip draw their customers from within the area.   
The remaining columns revisit the entry-population relationship at progressively 
finer levels of geographic disaggregation.   Column (2) shows that a 4-digit zip with an 
additional 1000 persons has 1.55 more restaurants.  Four-digit zips average 178 square 
miles, with a (hypothetically circular) radius of 6.2 miles.  The same entry-population 
relationship that holds for areas comprising hundreds of square miles also holds for these 
areas.  Finally, column (3) shows a similarly strong – but slightly muted – relationship   19
between entry and population at the 5-digit zip level.  These areas have mean area of 47 
miles, with an implied radius of 3 miles.   
Regardless of the level of geography analyzed, an additional 1000 persons raises 
the number of restaurants in the area by between 1.4 and 1.6.  One should note that this 
relationship does not need to hold.  Given consumers’ ability to travel, restaurants’ 
location could be decoupled from population.  Yet, the relationship between market size 
that holds for metro areas also holds for much narrower units of geography.  While it 
surely true that consumers travel outside their zipcodes to obtain restaurant food, it 
appears that zipcodes’ exports and imports roughly balance each other.  To say this 
another way, the number of restaurants near a consumer is very sensitive to the number of 
persons nearby.  This suggests that zipcode level analysis will be appropriate. 
We can examine the relationship between restaurant availability and local and 
distant population more directly by simply including both local (5-digit zip) and more 
distant population terms in the regressions directly.  In particular, we include a term for 
the population of the remainder of the 4-digit zip, as well as a term for the remainder of 
the 3-digit zip (see column 4 of table 4).  Local 5-digit zip population has a slightly 
smaller coefficient than in column (3) of table 4, and the population of the remainder of 
the 4-digit zipcode has a significant but small coefficient (one fortieth of the immediate 
zip coefficient).  Population of the remainder of the 3-digit zip has a negative and 
significant, but small, coefficient.  The results indicate that the empirical measure of 
demand relevant to restaurant entry in a 5-digit zipcode is overwhelmingly local (within 
the immediate 5-digit zipcode).   20
Existing entry studies tend to choose industries to make the choice of geography 
straightforward.  For example, Bresnahan and Reiss examine small businesses (for 
example, tire dealers and dentists) in small, geographically isolated markets.  A typical 
geographic area included in their studies had one or two firms.  In markets the size of 
those they include, customers would be willing to patronize a firm anywhere in the 
market area, so all local population was relevant to the determination of market size.  
Berry and Waldfogel (1999) study radio markets.  Since radio signals travel costlessly 
throughout metropolitan areas, the entire metro area is the obvious market to employ.  
Mazzeo (2002) examines entry into the hotel market, and his observations are exits off 
interstate highways, where except for the quality differentiation that is the focus of his 
study, hotels at the same exit are clearly in the same market. 
Seim’s (2003) study has a slightly more complicated situation which bears more 
comparison to ours.  Seim studies the location of video rental outlets, and in order to 
study spatial issues, she makes census tracts her unit of observation.  Her tracts have an 
average of 4400 persons and less than one video rental outlet, while the metropolitan 
areas overall have an average of 74,000 persons and 19 establishments.  Roughly 
speaking, this suggests that an outlet needs nearly 4000 persons as potential customers.  
Because the census tracts typically have too few to support a store, one must view 
demand as deriving from both own-tract and nearby-tract population. 
Our context differs in two respects.  First, the average amount of population per 
restaurant across markets in our sample is under 1000.  Our data are at the zipcode level, 
and the median MSA zipcode in the sample has population of 10,000, far above the 
average amount of population apparently needed to support a restaurant.  Accordingly,   21
the median zipcode has 12 restaurants.  The density of restaurants makes it less clear that 
population outside the immediate area will be an important determinant of restaurant 
location.   
 
3.  Population Mix and Product Availability: If You Come, they Will Build it 
Places with more people have more restaurants.  But do all sorts of people bring 
forth additional restaurants to a similar extent?  Table 5 revisits the regressions in table 4, 
replacing population with separate terms for black and non-black (“white”), Hispanic and 
non-Hispanic, and college-educated and non-college-educated population.  The 
regressions clearly show that different population groups bear different relationships to 
restaurant availability.  Black, Hispanics, and those without college education have 
smaller coefficients than non-blacks, non-Hispanics, and college educated persons, 
respectively.   For example, the more blacks, Hispanics, or non-college graduates there 
are nearby, holding total population constant, the fewer restaurants nearby. 
On its face this result seems to suggest that the product market mechanism that is 
the subject of this paper reinforces the other difficulties associated with residential 
segregation.  For example, in addition to all of the other pathologies experienced by 
blacks in heavily black neighborhoods, individuals also face fewer product options in the 
restaurant market.   
Our chain data allow us to observe the number of locations of each of 136 chains 
in each zipcode.  Thus we can ask how, for example, the number of McDonald’s 
locations varies across zipcodes with local black and white population.  Given what we 
know about groups’ preferences over restaurant food, we can ask whether restaurant   22
markets reinforce agglomeration of like types by asking whether there are more 
restaurants that appeal to particular groups where those groups are more prevalent.  What 
would we see if this view were correct?  Recalling tables 2 and 3, we have reason to 
expect that educated consumers prefer high-price and coffee/bagel outlets, black 
consumers prefer restaurants offering Southern fare, and (perhaps to a lesser extent) 
Hispanics prefer Mexican food.   We could analyze zipcode entry patterns for particular 
chains preferred by a group by asking, for example, whether Starbucks outlets are more 
likely to be available in zips with more college graduates. 
Studying entry one chain at a time ignores strategic interaction.  Whether 
McDonald’s wants to operate in a zipcode surely depends on whether a chain offering 
close substitutes, say Burger King, also operates there.  Hence, chain-by-chain entry 
models mischaracterize the relationship between population and entry.  As one 
aggregates from the chain to the category, say from KFC to all fried chicken chains, then 
if the category includes all relevant substitutes, the shortcomings of ignoring strategic 
interactions will decline. 
With these issues in mind, Table 6 reports regressions of this sort a few major 
chains (McDonald’, Burger King, Taco Bell, Dunkin Donuts) as well as three others 
(KFC, Popeye’s, and Starbuck’s) preferred by different groups.  The table includes 
estimates from 21 separate equations relating a particular chain’s presence in a 5-digit zip 
to, say, black and white population or, separately, Hispanic and non-Hispanic population, 
or, finally, to college and non-college educated population.  Probability derivatives from 
probit models are reported in the table.   23
The results on chain entry reflect our data on preferences.  While most black 
coefficients are smaller than the white coefficients, the black KFC and Popeye’s 
coefficients are larger.  None of the chains in this table has an Hispanic coefficient that 
exceeds its non-Hispanic coefficient.  Except Starbucks, and to a less extent Dunkin 
Donuts, all of the chains have smaller college than non-college coefficients.  Indeed, 
many coefficients are negative and significant: 5-digit zips with more college graduates, 
holding the non-college graduate population constant, are less likely to have a 
McDonald’s, a Burger King, or a Taco Bell present.  In interpreting these coefficients it 
is, again, important to recognize the one-at-a-time nature of the table 6 exercise.  College 
educated persons do not literally reduce the profitability of, say, a McDonalds outlet.  
Rather, 5-digit zips with more college-educated persons attract other entry that makes 
McDonald’s entry less likely. 
Aggregating particular chains into groups avoids some of the table 6 problems.  
Table 7 asks how entry of particular types of restaurants varies across 5-digit zips with 
black and white population.  The first three columns are OLS regressions with the 
numbers of sample chains, sample sitdown chains, and sample fast food chains as 
dependent variables.  Because the remaining columns are based on narrower categories, 
we estimate them as probits (with probability derivatives reported in the table).  As with 
restaurants overall (see table 5), places with more whites have more sample chains, 
especially in the sitdown category.  Places with more whites also have higher 
probabilities of sitdown restaurants in all three Consumer Reports price ranges (see 
columns 3-6).   24
The sample chain cuisine breakdown, in columns (7) – (11), indicates that places 
with more whites are more likely to have a pizza, Mexican, and especially a coffee/bagel 
restaurant.  Coefficients are nearly equal across race for the presence of a burger 
restaurant.  Finally, places with more blacks, holding total population constant, are more 
likely to have a sample chicken chain present.  Overall, 31 percent of sample zipcodes 
have a sample chicken chain restaurant.  By contrast, nearly 60 percent of the 811 
zipcodes that are over half black have a sample chicken chain.
11 
Tables 8-10 repeat the exercise of table 7 by Hispanic status, college education, 
and income (whether household income exceeds $40,000 per year).  Patterns for 
Hispanics are similar to those for blacks, except that the non-Hispanic coefficient exceeds 
the Hispanic coefficient for all of the particular sample chain cuisines. 
In table 9 the non-college coefficient exceeds the college coefficient for all 
restaurant categories, except for the two more expensive groups based on Consumer 
Reports price classifications and the coffee/bagel chains.  Overall, 28 percent of sample 
zipcodes have a coffee/bagel chain.  Over half of the 978 heavily educated (over 36 
percent of adults college educated) have a coffee/bagel chain from the sample.
12  In table 
10 the higher-income coefficient exceeds the lower-income coefficient for all restaurant 
groups except sample chicken and burger chains. 
                                                 
11 Similar patterns hold across four-digit zipcodes: 53 percent of sample four-digit zipcodes have a sample 
chicken chain; 70 percent of the heavily black (over a third black) four-digit zipcodes have a sample 
chicken chain. 
12 Similar patterns hold for four-digit zipcodes: 44 percent of sample four-digit zipcodes have a sample 
coffee/bagel chain, while 71 percent of the heavily (over a third) college educated four-digit zipcodes have 
a sample coffee/bagel chain.   25
The results in tables 7-10 clearly show that the mix of restaurants available in a 
zip code is sensitive to the mix of consumers.  Places with more members of a group 
preferring a particular cuisine are more likely to be served by a restaurant in that cuisine. 
 
IV. Conclusions and Implications 
What have we shown?  We have documented that agglomeration of 
demographically similar persons brings forth private products – in this case, restaurants – 
preferred by the agglomerating group.  Given the evidence we present on how 
preferences vary by group, this suggests welfare benefits of like-agglomeration, provided 
that people value proximity to their preferred restaurants. 
Residential location and sorting is a topic generally thought to be in the purview 
of public and urban economics.  The entire literature on Tiebout (1956) sorting is focused 
on choice of jurisdiction based on the nature of government-provided goods.  I do not 
dispute the importance of these goods and services, but I argue here that goods provided 
in private markets provide another important amenity for potential residents to consider 
when choosing communities. 
The theoretical idea advanced in this research – that with substantial fixed costs 
and heterogenous consumers, one’s welfare depends on the distribution of consumer 
types – is straightforward, even uncontroversial.  The only question has been whether the 
mechanism is important or even detectable.  The industries where it has been previously 
documented are unusual in the size of their fixed costs.   Yet, the restaurant industry, with 
an establishment per 1000 people, has low fixed costs.  What is remarkable here is that 
the mechanism operates in an industry with low fixed costs.   26
Like local public goods, the private production of local private goods also entails 
fixed costs, which makes their provision lumpy and sensitive to the distribution of 
preferences.   The median voter holds a celebrated place in economists’ thinking about 
residential sorting and the provision of local public goods.  For some sorts of goods – 
restaurants may be a prime example – the median customer may be a useful metaphor.   
That agglomeration brings about a benefit to persons, in their capacity as 
restaurant patrons, says nothing about whether this mechanism causes, or even 
contributes to, the agglomeration of like individuals.  And, indeed, it is hard to believe 
that the pull of appealing restaurants weighs heavily against, say schools, parks, housing, 
or public safety in neighborhood choice. Still, the fact that the availability of products 
privately provided under conditions of increasing costs in some industry is at least 
suggestive that this mechanism might operate in other industries as well.  Retailing and 
the provision of worship services come to mind as other venues where these mechanisms 
might operate.   The usual call for more research is warranted.     27
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Table 1a: Population, Restaurants, and Demographic Mix, by Level of Geographic Aggregation 
           
5-digit zips  mean  median  75
th  90
th  N 
Restaurants  24.9  12  38  68  14954 
population  15,450  9,965  24,269  37,919  14954 
% black  9.5  2.1  9.4  28.8  14903 
% Hispanic  9.8  2.7  8.8  27.5  14903 
% college  17.7  15.9  24.0  32.3  14764 
% inc > 40k  54.7  54.8  67.3  77.2  14716 
Sq. miles  47.2  18.0  48.2  100.6  14931 
radius  2.95  2.40  3.92  5.66  14931 
           
4-digit zips  mean  median  75
th  90
th  N 
Restaurants  94.1  41  127  256  3960 
population  58,344  30,772  79,677  150,671  3960 
% black  8.4  2.8  10.5  24.7  3945 
% Hispanic  8.8  2.6  8.4  24.4  3945 
% college  17.9  16.7  22.7  28.9  3931 
% inc > 40k  54.8  54.4  64.6  73.0  3923 
Sq. miles  177.8  99.5  194.6  329.1  3960 
radius  6.23  5.63  7.87  10.23  3960 
           
3-digit zips  mean  median  75
th  90
th  N 
Restaurants  545.0  335  676  1259  684 
population  337,800  204,100  421,200  782,900  684 
% black  10.5  5.9  15.4  28.2  684 
% Hispanic  9.7  3.9  10.9  27.3  684 
% college  19.1  18.3  22.4  26.9  684 
% inc > 40k  52.8  51.2  60.1  67.9  684 
Sq. miles  1029.3  624.2  1224.0  2002.7  684 
radius  15.1  14.1  19.7  25.2  684   31




  5-digit zip    4-digit zip    3-digit zip   
  Number  Presence  Number  Presence  Number  Presence 
Restaurants  24.93  87.95%  94.14  93.96%  545.05  98.98% 
  Sample Chains  7.19  64.14%  27.15  80.28%  157.16  95.91% 
    Fast Food  5.65  63.32%  21.35  79.65%  123.60  95.91% 
    Sitdown  1.54  40.60%  5.80  63.23%  33.56  92.84% 
       Chicken  0.54  31.12%  2.04  53.03%  11.79  89.77% 
       Pizza  1.02  41.75%  3.88  64.17%  22.48  93.27% 
       Burger  1.89  52.93%  7.15  72.22%  41.41  93.57% 
       Mexican  0.39  26.09%  1.49  48.86%  8.62  86.70% 
       Steak  0.16  10.81%  0.61  28.26%  3.52  73.25% 
       Coffee,Bagel  0.57  27.54%  2.15  43.59%  12.46  73.25% 
             
N   14954  14954  3960  3960  684  684   32
 
 Table 2: Tendency to Patronize Selected Fast Food Chain Restaurants 
 
 
Visit in last 30 





black  black  black/non  Non_Hisp  Hispanic  hisp/non  No College  College  coll/nocoll 
markets 
present 
  Arbys   22.1%  18.5%  0.83  21.9%  20.4%  0.93  21.8%  21.3%  0.98  65 
Chicken  Boston mkt  8.2%  9.6%  1.16  8.5%  9.1%  1.07  7.5%  10.2%  1.37  50 
Coffee/bagel  Brueggers   10.9%  11.7%  1.08  10.8%  10.7%  0.98  7.8%  16.2%  2.09  9 
Burger  Burger King   44.2%  52.1%  1.18  44.2%  53.4%  1.21  46.7%  41.9%  0.90  66 
  Captain D’s Seafood  14.9%  22.7%  1.52  16.4%  16.9%  1.03  18.0%  12.7%  0.71  17 
Coffee/bagel  Caribou Coffee   4.8%  4.4%  0.92  4.6%  4.1%  0.89  2.7%  7.6%  2.77  7 
Burger  Checkers   9.7%  20.7%  2.14  10.9%  17.0%  1.56  12.1%  9.4%  0.77  10 
Chicken  Chick-Fil-A  12.9%  14.7%  1.14  12.8%  14.4%  1.12  12.1%  15.0%  1.24  42 
Chicken  Church’s Fried 
Chicken     4.9%  22.7%  4.64  6.8%  10.4%  1.54  8.4%  5.2%  0.62  39 
Pizza  Cici’s Pizza  12.7%  12.2%  0.97  11.3%  18.1%  1.61  12.8%  11.5%  0.90  7 
  Dairy Queen  16.3%  14.2%  0.87  16.2%  16.1%  1.00  14.5%  14.0%  0.97  60 
Pizza  Dominos    11.8%  15.3%  1.30  11.5%  17.8%  1.55  12.6%  11.2%  0.89  66 
Coffee/bagel  Einstein   6.2%  4.9%  0.79  6.3%  5.3%  0.83  4.5%  9.2%  2.06  22 
Mexican  El Pollo Loco  11.0%  12.3%  1.12  8.9%  17.7%  1.99  11.3%  10.5%  0.92  5 
burger  Hardee’s   19.0%  18.6%  0.98  19.0%  18.0%  0.95  20.6%  15.4%  0.75  32 
Chicken  KFC   22.8%  38.9%  1.71  24.4%  26.7%  1.09  26.3%  21.5%  0.82  66 
Burger  Krystal   19.0%  28.6%  1.51  20.5%  24.5%  1.20  22.7%  16.0%  0.70  6 
Chicken  Lees Famous  11.8%  20.7%  1.75  12.8%  15.2%  1.19  14.1%  9.7%  0.69  6 
Pizza  Lil Caesar   5.5%  7.6%  1.38  5.3%  8.7%  1.64  6.0%  4.8%  0.80  64 
  Long John Silver  10.3%  14.2%  1.38  10.5%  11.9%  1.13  11.9%  8.1%  0.68  52 
Burger  McDonalds   53.4%  60.1%  1.13  53.4%  61.1%  1.14  54.9%  52.8%  0.96  66 
  Miami sub   7.8%  13.1%  1.68  8.6%  11.0%  1.28  8.7%  8.2%  0.94  5 
Chicken  Mrs Winner’s   8.2%  20.1%  2.44  10.8%  11.1%  1.03  11.6%  9.5%  0.82  5 
Coffee/bagel  Noah bagel  6.5%  7.3%  1.11  7.1%  4.3%  0.60  4.9%  9.0%  1.82  3   33
Pizza  Papa John  13.7%  13.9%  1.02  13.5%  16.3%  1.20  13.0%  15.0%  1.15  55 
Pizza  Peter  Piper  5.9%  10.1%  1.70  3.7%  14.4%  3.93  7.3%  3.7%  0.51  5 
chicken  Popeye’s    10.4%  30.3%  2.93  13.1%  19.6%  1.50  14.6%  11.7%  0.80  20 
  Quiznos   4.9%  4.4%  0.90  4.8%  4.8%  1.01  3.9%  6.1%  1.55  7 
Burger  Rallys   11.0%  24.1%  2.20  12.7%  16.0%  1.26  14.0%  10.4%  0.74  18 
Coffee/bagel  Starbucks   7.5%  6.0%  0.81  7.4%  8.1%  1.10  5.5%  10.6%  1.94  59 
  Subway   22.7%  24.5%  1.08  22.9%  24.9%  1.09  22.4%  24.3%  1.09  66 
Mexican  Taco Bell   32.8%  35.1%  1.07  32.7%  38.8%  1.19  4.3%  5.6%  1.31  65 
Burger  Wendys   32.0%  35.9%  1.12  32.4%  33.8%  1.04  32.2%  33.0%  1.02  66 
Burger  White Castle  18.7%  35.1%  1.87  20.8%  21.4%  1.03  23.1%  16.0%  0.69  9 
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Table 3: Tendency to Patronize Selected Sit Down Chain Restaurants 





chain  non-black  black  black/non  Non-Hisp  Hispanic  hisp/non  No College  College  coll/nocoll Markets 
2    Applebees  17.0%  17.1%  1.01  17.2%  16.0%  0.93  16.4%  18.7%  1.14  61 
3  Pizza  Bertucci’s  6.7%  4.9%  0.72  6.5%  6.9%  1.05  5.0%  8.7%  1.74  6 
3    Cheeseck Factory  7.5%  7.8%  1.04  8.2%  6.5%  0.80  6.1%  10.4%  1.68  4 
2    Chilis   10.4%  8.3%  0.80  10.1%  11.7%  1.15  8.9%  12.5%  1.40  49 
    Chuck E Cheese  3.8%  7.0%  1.84  3.8%  7.5%  1.99  5.1%  3.1%  0.62  5 
1    Denny’s   11.3%  12.9%  1.15  11.3%  13.3%  1.18  12.3%  9.8%  0.79  63 
  Mexican  Don Pablo’s Mex.  6.0%  4.2%  0.69  5.8%  7.1%  1.22  4.8%  8.0%  1.68  11 
  Steak  Golden Corral  14.5%  22.1%  1.53  15.3%  17.3%  1.13  16.8%  13.0%  0.77  14 
2    Hooters   4.5%  4.6%  1.02  4.2%  7.5%  1.79  4.3%  4.8%  1.11  10 
4    Houston   4.6%  7.1%  1.56  5.4%  5.8%  1.06  4.1%  7.9%  1.91  6 
1    IHOP   9.0%  14.0%  1.55  9.6%  11.0%  1.14  9.8%  9.4%  0.96  33 
3  Steak  Lonestar   5.6%  5.1%  0.90  5.4%  5.8%  1.08  5.3%  5.6%  1.05  24 
3    Romano’s Macaroni   6.5%  4.8%  0.74  6.6%  5.9%  0.89  5.1%  8.3%  1.64  13 
2    Max & Erma   7.7%  7.8%  1.01  7.8%  6.7%  0.86  6.1%  11.3%  1.86  5 
3    Olive Garden  12.2%  10.9%  0.90  12.1%  10.8%  0.89  11.3%  13.5%  1.19  57 
3  Steak  Outback   10.0%  9.3%  0.93  10.1%  8.3%  0.82  9.3%  11.2%  1.21  57 
    Pappade   7.8%  14.5%  1.87  9.7%  5.6%  0.58  7.4%  11.6%  1.56  3 
  Pizza  Pizza Hut   15.0%  18.1%  1.21  14.8%  19.8%  1.34  16.0%  14.5%  0.91  66 
2  Pizza  Pizzeria Uno  3.3%  4.1%  1.25  3.3%  4.7%  1.45  2.7%  4.2%  1.56  5 
    Quincys   8.0%  13.1%  1.63  8.9%  10.4%  1.17  10.1%  5.9%  0.59  5 
3    Red Lobster  9.6%  15.1%  1.58  10.3%  10.7%  1.04  10.4%  10.0%  0.96  66 
    Rio Bravo Cantina  6.7%  3.9%  0.58  5.9%  15.7%  2.67  5.2%  8.1%  1.56  3 
2    Ruby Tuesday  8.8%  8.1%  0.92  8.7%  8.5%  0.98  8.3%  9.6%  1.14  21 
6  Steak  Ruths Chris   2.1%  2.1%  0.98  2.2%  3.0%  1.40  1.5%  3.3%  2.20  6 
    Shells   3.5%  5.5%  1.57  12.0%  11.1%  0.93  13.0%  9.6%  0.74  19 
    Sweet Tomatoes  6.5%  3.7%  0.57  7.0%  4.0%  0.57  5.1%  8.3%  1.61  4 
3    TGI Fridays  8.1%  10.1%  1.24  8.4%  9.4%  1.11  7.5%  10.3%  1.36  46   35
3    Tony Roma   4.0%  6.1%  1.51  4.4%  3.7%  0.83  4.0%  5.0%  1.27  10   36
Table 4: Restaurants and Population at Various Levels of Geography 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  3-digit zip  4-digit zip  5-digit zip  5-digit zip 
Population (000)  1.5053  1.5500  1.3869   
  (0.0307)**  (0.0171)**  (0.0125)**   
5-digit zip pop (000)        1.3334 
        (0.0146)** 
Rest of 4-digit zip pop (000)        0.0297 
        (0.0031)** 
Rest of 3-digit zip pop (000)        -0.0027 
        (0.0005)** 
Constant  36.5925  3.7116  3.5030  3.3209 
  (15.7039)*  (1.6138)*  (0.2787)**  (0.3144)** 
Observations  684  3960  14954  14954 
R-squared  0.78  0.68  0.45  0.45 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     37
Table 5: Restaurant Entry and Population Composition, Various Levels of Geographic Aggregation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  5-digit zip  5-digit zip  5-digit zip  4-digit zip  4-digit zip  4-digit zip  3-digit zip  3-digit zip  3-digit zip 
White Pop (000)  1.5301      1.6656      1.5062     
  (0.0141)**      (0.0235)**      (0.0429)**     
Black Pop (000)  0.6432      1.0949      1.5009     
  (0.0372)**      (0.0663)**      (0.1443)**     
Non Hispanic Pop (000)    1.6885      1.8977      1.8842   
    (0.0151)**      (0.0215)**      (0.0372)**   
Hisp. Pop (000)    0.5819      0.5780      0.5784   
    (0.0271)**      (0.0435)**      (0.0684)**   
College Educ’d Pop (000)      2.5800      4.1417      4.6446 
      (0.0830)**      (0.1566)**      (0.3074)** 
Non-coll. (000)      1.6854      1.4644      1.2353 
      (0.0288)**      (0.0481)**      (0.0926)** 
Constant  3.0887  1.5824  1.7673  1.3379  -4.2379  -0.5201  36.5142  -20.7481  17.3144 
  (0.2753)**  (0.2752)**  (0.2535)**  (1.6382)  (1.5434)**  (1.3141)  (15.9129)*  (14.2306)  (10.3865) 
Observations  14954  14954  14931  3960  3960  3960  684  684  684 
R-squared  0.47  0.49  0.55  0.68  0.72  0.79  0.78  0.83  0.91 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  . 
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Table 6: Chain Presence and Group Population in 5-Digit Zip 
  white  black  Non-Hisp  Hisp  College  Non-Coll 
McDonalds  0.0252  0.0235  0.0337  0.0072  -0.0258  0.0525 
  (0.0004)**  (0.0011)**  (0.0005)**  (0.0007)**  (0.0025)**  (0.0010)** 
Burger King  0.0159  0.0094  0.0183  0.0054  -0.0147  0.0289 
  (0.0003)**  (0.0006)**  (0.0003)**  (0.0005)**  (0.0016)**  (0.0006)** 
Taco Bell  0.013  0.0057  0.0148  0.0038  -0.0063  0.0211 
  (0.0002)**  (0.0006)**  (0.0003)**  (0.0004)**  (0.0013)**  (0.0005)** 
KFC  0.0126  0.0169  0.0161  0.0057  -0.0202  0.0275 
  (0.0002)**  (0.0007)**  (0.0003)**  (0.0004)**  (0.0014)**  (0.0006)** 
Popeye's Fried Chicken  0.0023  0.0063  0.0035  0.0021  -0.003  0.0057 
  (0.0001)**  (0.0003)**  (0.0001)**  (0.0002)**  (0.0006)**  (0.0002)** 
Starbucks  0.0097  -0.0037  0.0099  0.0024  0.0553  -0.0005 
  (0.0002)**  (0.0007)**  (0.0002)**  (0.0004)**  (0.0016)**  -0.0004 
Dunkin Donuts  0.0048  0.0042  0.0062  0.0004  0.0067  0.0064 
  (0.0002)**  (0.0004)**  (0.0002)**  -0.0003  (0.0009)**  (0.0003)** 
N  14954    14931    14931   
Notes: Probit estimates where each row reflects three separate equations, one  
with black and white (non-black) population, another with Hisp and non-Hisp, etc.  Probability  
derivatives reported.  Population is measured in thousands.   39
 
 
Table 7: Restaurant Targeting and Race Distribution 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 






CR $  CR $$  CR $$$+  Chicken  Pizza  Burger  Mexican  Coffee, 
bagel 
White (000)  0.4624  0.1051  0.3573  0.0127  0.0083  0.0061  0.0177  0.0290  0.0302  0.0153  0.0152 
  (0.0042)**  (0.0015)**  (0.0030)**  (0.0002)**  (0.0002)**  (0.0002)**  (0.0003)**  (0.0004)**  (0.0005)**  (0.0003)**  (0.0003)** 
Black (000)  0.2220  0.0190  0.2031  0.0033  0.0007  0.0013  0.0340  0.0123  0.0285  0.0053  0.0026 
  (0.0112)**  (0.0040)**  (0.0080)**  (0.0006)**  (0.0005)  (0.0004)**  (0.0011)**  (0.0009)**  (0.0014)**  (0.0006)**  (0.0007)** 
Constant  0.5317  0.0861  0.4456                 
  (0.0828)**  (0.0296)**  (0.0593)**                 
Observations  14954  14954  14954  14954  14954  14954  14954  14954  14954  14954  14954 
R-squared  0.47  0.25  0.52                 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Columns (1)-(3) are OLS regressions.  Remaining 
columns are probit estimates with probability derivatives reported.   40
Table 8: Restaurant Targeting and Hispanic Status 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 










0.5323  0.1217  0.4106  0.0144  0.0100  0.0075  0.0236  0.0335  0.0423  0.0165  0.0169 
  (0.0045)**  (0.0016)**  (0.0032)**  (0.0003)**  (0.0002)**  (0.0002)**  (0.0004)**  (0.0005)**  (0.0006)**  (0.0003)**  (0.0003)** 
Hispanic  0.1336  0.0097  0.1239  0.0027  -0.0006  -0.0010  0.0089  0.0082  0.0076  0.0059  0.0036 
  (0.0080)**  (0.0029)**  (0.0057)**  (0.0004)**  (0.0004)  (0.0004)**  (0.0005)**  (0.0007)**  (0.0007)**  (0.0004)**  (0.0005)** 
Constant  -0.0480  -0.0682  0.0201                 
  (0.0812)  (0.0296)*  (0.0579)                 
Observations  14954  14954  14954  14954  14954  14954  14954  14954  14954  14954  14954 
R-squared  0.51  0.28  0.56                 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Columns (1)-(3) are OLS regressions.  Remaining 
columns are probit estimates with probability derivatives reported.   41
Table 9: Restaurant Targeting and Education Distribution 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 










0.2589  0.1159  0.1430  0.0038  0.0157  0.0157  -0.0251  0.0129  -0.0411  -0.0049  0.0784 
  (0.0264)**  (0.0096)**  (0.0188)**  (0.0013)**  (0.0010)**  (0.0009)**  (0.0019)**  (0.0027)**  (0.0031)**  (0.0014)**  (0.0023)** 
Non-coll.  0.6354  0.1228  0.5126  0.0177  0.0079  0.0048  0.0401  0.0423  0.0702  0.0237  0.0059 
  (0.0092)**  (0.0033)**  (0.0065)**  (0.0005)**  (0.0004)**  (0.0003)**  (0.0008)**  (0.0009)**  (0.0012)**  (0.0006)**  (0.0006)** 
Constant  0.3112  0.0347  0.2765                 
  (0.0806)**  (0.0294)  (0.0574)**                 
Observations  14931  14931  14931  14931  14931  14931  14931  14931  14931  14931  14931 
R-squared  0.50  0.27  0.55                 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Columns (1)-(3) are OLS regressions.  Remaining 
columns are probit estimates with probability derivatives reported. 
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Table 10: Restaurant Targeting and Income     
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 






CR $  CR $$  CR $$$+  Chicken  Pizza  Burger  Mexican  Coffee, 
bagel 
HH Inc > 40k  1.4859  0.3842  1.1017  0.0426  0.0355  0.0269  0.0396  0.1058  0.0907  0.0440  0.0885 
  (0.0229)**  (0.0085)**  (0.0163)**  (0.0013)**  (0.0010)**  (0.0009)**  (0.0016)**  (0.0025)**  (0.0028)**  (0.0014)**  (0.0019)** 
HH Inc < 40k  0.9828  0.1499  0.8328  0.0216  0.0055  0.0036  0.0777  0.0544  0.1107  0.0330  -0.0087 
  (0.0262)**  (0.0097)**  (0.0186)**  (0.0014)**  (0.0011)**  (0.0009)**  (0.0021)**  (0.0025)**  (0.0035)**  (0.0015)**  (0.0017)** 
Constant  0.0720  -0.0425  0.1145                 
  (0.0780)  (0.0289)  (0.0554)*                 
Observations  14931  14931  14931  14931  14931  14931  14931  14931  14931  14931  14931 
R-squared  0.53  0.29  0.58                 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Columns (1)-(3) are OLS regressions.  Remaining 
columns are probit estimates with probability derivatives reported. 
 